Xinyu et al. proposed a public key exchange protocol, which is based on the NTRU-lattice based cryptography. In this paper, we show how Xinyu et al.'s NTRU-KE: A lattice based key exchange protocol can be broken, under the assumption that a man-in-the middle attack is used for extracting private keys of users who participate in the key exchange protocol.
Introduction
Key exchange protocol is one of the public key cryptographic primitives that provides a platform to negotiate keys among a group of parties. In a key exchange protocol, private keys can be exchanged among the group of parties over public insecure communication networks and agree upon a common session key, which can be used for later secure communication among them. A security goal of the key exchange protocol is that private keys are to be shared among the group of parties without compromising their secrecy. Key exchange protocol works as one of the basic building blocks for constructing other high-level secure protocols and is used to provide perfect forward secrecy in Transport Layer Security's ephemeral modes.
A key exchange protocol was introduced by Diffie-Hellman during 1976 in their seminal paper [8] . The Diffie-Hellman (or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) key exchange protocol security relies on the (or Elliptic Curve) discrete logarithmic problem over a finite field [4, 6, 8] . The Diffie-Hellman (or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellmann) key exchange protocol is vulnerable to a quantum computer attack as a result of the Shor's algorithm [5] . Recent proposals [1, 2, 7] for key exchange protocol are alternative candidates against quantum attack. In 2013, Xinyu et al. proposed a public key exchange protocol [7] which is no longer dependent on number-theoretic cryptographic hard assumption problems. Their proposal is based on the post-quantum NTRU-lattice based cryptosystem [3] . The NTRU lattice based encryption is a fast feasibly secured scheme introduced in 1996 by Hoffstein et al. [3] and has been commercially standardized. The security of the NTRU cryptosystem [3] relies on the "shortest vector problem" and the "closest vector problem". Xinyu et al. proposed an NTRU -key exchange protocol [7] by adapting the NTRU lattice based encryption scheme [3] .
A man-in the middle attack is a cyber attack where an eavesdropper intercepts a communication between two participated parties and injects his own message. This attack can succeed only when the eavesdropper, Eve can impersonate each endpoint to their satisfaction as expected from the legitimate other end. This paper describes how Xinyu et al.'s NTRU-Key exchange protocol is not safe against man -in-the middle attack; Eve is able to recover both parties' private keys.
Preliminaries

Notations and Mathematical Background
Throughout this paper, we denote Z the integer ring and Z q is the ring Z/qZ. A truncated polynomial ring
consists of polynomials with degree less than N and co-efficients in Z q . An element f ∈ R q can be written as a polynomial,
Two polynomials f and g ∈ R q are multiplied by the ordinary convolution,
.., N − 1, which is commutative and associative. The convolution product is presented by * to distinguish it from the multiplication in Z q . We define a center l 2 −norm of an element f ∈ R q by
Xinyu et al.'s NTRU-Key exchange protocol
Xinyu et al.'s NTRU -Key exchange protocol [7] public parameters (N,p,q) are chosen such that N-is a prime, p and q are co-prime, gcd(p, q) = 1, and q is larger than p. The selection process of parameters is the same as the NTRU-Encryption scheme [3] . Readers are encouraged to refer to [7] for further details. We now present briefly Xinyu et al.'s NTRU -Key exchange protocol in the following algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Xinyu et al.'s NTRU-Key Exchange Protocol Alice
Step 2:
Step3:
Step 4: A man-in-the middle attack is described as follows: -Step 1: An adversary, Eve intercepts both the public keys h A and h B sent by Alice and Bob, respectively and computes two of her own public keys, Step 3: After intercepting e ′ and e ′′ sent by Alice and Bob, respectively, Eve computes
to recover Alice's private key f A and Bob's private keyf B , respectively.
conclusion
In this paper, we have described how Xinyu et al.'s NTRU-KE protocol is insecure against a man-in-the middle attack. The process of this attack has been explained-how an attacker can recover private keys of both parties. Note that Xinyu et al.'s NTRU-Key exchange protocol is trivially insecure against a manin the middle attack for unauthenticated public keys used in this protocol.
